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REPORTS.
ARBITRATION.

In Munson v. Straits of Dever S. S. Co. 99 Fed. 789, a
suit in admiralty, the question arose under a charter which
D=ages for
Refusalto

provided generally for submission to arbitration.
One of the parties, disregarding this provision,

Arbitrate brought a libel against the other, which the court
dismissed without costs. The defendant then filed this libel
against the plaintiff for breach of the agreement to arbitrate,
averring as his basis for damages the fact that his expenses for
counsel, etc., in the former suit were greater than those he
would have incurred had the matter been submitted to arbitration. Judge Brown of the District Court (S. D. N. Y.) dismissed the libel, holding that no adequate damages had been
proven, and it was clear that a libel in admiralty would not lie
for the recovery of nominal damages. The opinion covers
all the authorities on the subject, after an ekamination of
which Judge Brown remarks that there is no reported case
where a recovery has been allowed for breach of a merely
executory agreement to arbitrate.
BANKRUPTCY.

"A court of bankruptcy ought to be as honest as other people." This expression, taken from the opinion in Ex ParteJames,
Payent to 9 Ch. App. 609, was made by Judge Baker of the
Trustee I. District Court (D. Md.) the basis of his decision
Ignorance of that a trustee in bankruptcy may not take advanLaw, Recovery

tage of the well-known rule of law that a volun-

tary payment, made in ignorance of law, cannot be recovered
back. In In Re Myers, 99 Fed. 69 , the bankrupt had a deposit of $777 in a bank, which transferred the same to the
credit of the trustee in bankruptcy and proved its claim against
the estate on a $5,ooo note of the bankrupt, held by it. Subsequently the bank found out that it would have had the right
to retain the deposit as a set-off against the note; it therefore
presented a petition praying for leave to withhold the $777 for
its own benefit, and to file a new proof of claim for $4,223.
485
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Held, that the petition should be granted, since the case should
be governed by equity and not by the above-mentioned rule
of law.
BILLS AND NOTES.

Mrrison v. Bank, 6o Pac. (Oklia.) 273, affirms the rule, prevailing in some jurisdictions, that the mere receipt of a note
by a bank, which thereupon credits the depositor
Ban a
Holder for with the amount of the note, does not i2pso facto
Value
render the bank a holder for value. To become
so, the bank must actually part with something in return for
the note, i. e., the depositor must either draw or check out the
amount.
Courts now give a reasonable interpretation to the rule that
the amount of a promissory note must be certain and capable
of being ascertained at any time. Formerly the
Negotbty
Exchange

addition of the words, "payable with exchange,"

was held to destroy the negotiability of a note,
but nowadays the great weight of authority is to the contrary: Clark v. Skeen, 6o Pac. 325.
CHAMPERTY.

In Utah, as in most other states, an agreement with an
attorney for a contingent fee is valid and binding upon both
Attorney's parties, but the courts have drawn the line where
Agreement to such agreements contemplate an undertaking on
Bear E peses the party of the attorney to supply the costs of

the suit. In Nelson v. Evans, 6o Pac. 557, the attorney agreed
to pay all costs, taxable or otherwise, including the cost of
procuring witnesses. The client paid the costs of suit and
sued the attorney for their recovery. The Supreme Court of
Utah decided that this provision in the agreement was chainpertous and unenforceable.
A statute of Colorado (Gen. Stat. § 815) prohibits any person from "officiously intermeddling" with a suit of another.
Supplying In Casserleighv. Wood, 59 Pac. 1024, the validity
Evidence for of a contract was in question whereby one party
Another
agreed to procure and supply evidence for an
action which the other was about to bring, the consideration
being a contingent fee based upon the recovery. "The Court
of Appeals of Colorado, in an exhaustive opinion by Wilson,
J., decided that the strict English rules against champerty
and maintenance do not prevail generally in this country, and
that the above agreement was not contrary to public Volicy.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS.

While it is generally true that the application of the statute

of limitations is governed by the law of the forum, to the
Statute of exclusion of the law of the place where the action
Limitations, arises, yet a well-recognized exception exists
Stockholder's where the cause of action is based entirely upon
a foreign statute. Thus in Brunswick Co. v. Bank,
Liability,
99 Fed. 635, an action was brought in Maryland to enforce
the individual liability of a stockholder in a Georgia corporation under a Georgia statute. The Circuit Court of Appeals
(4 th Circ.) decided that the Georgia statute of limitations
relating to stockholders' liability, and not the Maryland
statute of limitations, applied. Brawley, J., dissented.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Following the leading case of Rwy. Co. v. Smith, 173 U. S.
684, the Court of Appeals in Beardsley v. N. Y., etc., Rwy. Co.,
56 N. E. 488, decided that the New York act of
Statute
1895 (C. 1027), requiring all railroads in New York
Requiring
to issue tooo-mile ticket books for $20, was, as
Issue of
applied to railroads incorporated previous to i895,
zooo-Miie
Ticket Books void as depriving them of property without due
process of law. But the act is valid as to -railroads subsequently incorporated, since they receive their charters on the
express condition that they will obey its provisions: Purdy v.
Erie Rwy. Co., 56 N. E. 509.
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Atchison, etc., Rwy. Co. v.
Campbell,59 Pac. 10 5 1, has declared unconstitutional, as being
in conflict with the fourteenth amendment 'to the
Issue of
Constitution of the United States, a statute of
Drovers'
Kansas (1895, C. 195) requiring railroad comPasses
panies within that state to allow every shipper of cattle, or
one of his employes, to travel free of charge with each shipment of cattle. The statute was held to be without the police
power, since it did not sufficiently appear to the court that the
mere fact that the shipper traveled with the cattle, which
were completely under the control of the railroad company,
would contribute at all to the safety of the cattle or to the
general public welfare. In his opinion, Doster, C. J., says that
he does not believe that the word "person" in the fourteenth
amendment was intended to refer to corporations, but he yields
gracefully to the authority of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
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CONTRACTS.

In Brewer v. Horst-LachmundCo., 6o Pac. 418, the Supreme
Court of California held that an offer and acceptance by telegram were memoranda sufficient to take the
transaction out of the statute of frauds.
Telegams
CORPORATIONS.

The rule which protects members of an association which
has been irregularly incorporated requires that the person
Irr.
g
seeking to hold them as partners shall have dealt
incorporation,

with them as a corporation; in other words, the

basis of the rule is the implied agreement between
the parties that the contract shall be made with the corporation alone and that recourse shall be had only against the
treasury of the corporation. This view is supported by
Slocum v. Head et al., 81 N. W. 673, where the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin decided that evidence was admissible on behalf
of the plaintiff, to show that at the time he dealt with the
irregularly incorporated association he was informed that he
was dealing with a partnership and that he intended to treat
the defendants as partners.
UabiUty

CRIMINAL LAW.

An indictment for bigamy averred that the defendant, A. P.
Niece, while his wife, Anna L. Niece, was living and undithat
N. J. Overman. Held,
vorced, married one insufficient,
since it did not
the indictment was
BIgmy,
contain an allegation that N. J. Overman was not
the wife of the defendant at the time of his second marriage.;
and the mere fact that the name N. J. Overman was different
from that of A. P. Niece and Anna L. Niece was insufficient, in
strict criminal law, to enable the court to infer that N. J. Overman and Anna L. Niece were different persons: Niece v. Territory, 6o Pac. (Okla.) 300.
FVIDENCB.

In Archer v. United States, 6o Pac. 268, a case involving a
question of disputed handwriting, the plaintiff endeavored to
prove that a certain document was written by the
DlpU1
Handwzitlng, defendant. The plaintiff produced an affidavit,
Test Paper, the signature to which was declared by experts,
Identification

basing their opinion upon comparisons with the

defendant's handwriting, to have been the defendant's.

The

plaintiff was then allowed to submit the signature to the affidavit as a test paper to experts, who compared it with the
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EVIDENCE (Continued).

document in question and declared the handwriting to be the
same. Upon appeal, the action of the trial court was held in
error by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, upon the ground,
intimated, though not decided, in Travis v. Brown, 43 Pa. 9,
that the identification of a document as a test paper must be
established by evidence other than mere comparison. "To
say that the standard writing may be established by comparison
with some other standard is to base a probability upon a probability, and if this may be done in the first instance it may be
followed by proving successive standards by comparison with
other standards resting solely on opinion evidence, until the
real question to be established is lost in confusion." Per Burford, C. J.
In a divorce suit before the Superior Court of Delaware a
United States letter carrier was called to the stand, and asked
by questions
Testimony
Tettmoriy
byparties iin
Letter Carrier

in regard to the action of one of the
directing
him to
iet
ot deliver letters to

another person and at another house, etc. Objection was made that there was a United States postal regulation forbidding letter carriers to disclose information of this
character; therefore such information was privileged, as being
received by a government officer in his official capacity.
Held, that the questions should be answered: Smith v. Smith,
45 Atl. 848.
Hankinson v. Lynn Electric Co., 56 N. E. 6o4, presents a
very interesting question. Is the testimony of a person as
Testimony_
to Puwrpw of
Act, Conclu,

to his motive upon a particular occasion conclusive, in the absence of evidence to the contrary? This was an action against an electric

company for injuries received from a piece of carbon thrown down upon the street by one of the defendants'
linemen. The lineman testified positively that he threw down
the carbon for a private purpose of his own: "I threw the
carbon at the team to attract his [the plaintiff's] attention, so
that I might speak to him, and not for any business of the
company." Of course there was no other direct evidence on
the question of motive, and the defendant insisted that the
above evidence was conclusive proof that the lineman was not
acting within the scope of his employment. *The trial judge,
however, left the question to the jury, and a verdict for the
plaintiff was approved by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
chiefly on the ground that the lineman was in the employ of
the defendant; therefore, his testimony, although uncontradicted, was open to suspicion.
siveness
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INFANCY.

Merchants, enraged at the plea of infancy being set up to
preclude recovery for goods sold, where the transactions have
appeared regular, have often endeavored to hold
Contract
laduced by the infant in tort for conversion. Thus in Slayton
Fraud of
v. Barry, 56 N. E. 575, the infant had represented
Infnt
himself to be of full age, whereupon the plaintiff
sued him in trover, alleging that no title passed, by reason of
the fraud in the transaction. Adopting the general rule, in
opposition to the one in force in New Hampshire and a few
other states, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts decided that
since the fraud was inseparably connected with the contract,
the plaintiff's claim for recovery would have to be based on
the contract, and that he could not evade the law of infancy
by sounding his action in tort. Judgment for the defendant
was therefore affirmed.

INSURANCE.

Some early cases held that no person could take out valid
insurance unless he had an interest in the property insured
when the policy was taken out. However, in Sun
laterestof
Insured at
Insurance Office v. Mferz, 45 Atl. 785, the Court of
Execution of Appeals of New Jersey showed that this rule has
Policy
been abrogated, and at the present day the only
test is whether or not the insured has an insurable interest at
the time of the loss.
A stipulation in a policy of fire insurance that no officer or
agent of the company shall have power to waive any of the
Waiver
conditions of the policy applies only to those conBefore and ditions and provisions in the policy which relate
After Lo,
to the formation and continuance of the contract
of insurance, and are essential to the binding force of the contract while it is running, and does not apply to those conditions
which are to be performed after loss has occurred, in order to
enable the insured to sue on his contract, such as giving notice
and furnishing preliminary proofs: Washburn Co. v. Merchants'
United FireInsurance Co., 81 N. W. (Iowa) 707.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

In Wells Co. v. Enright, 6o kac. 439, it was contended that
an agreement not to plead the statute of limitations was void
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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS (Continued).
Agmement
not to Plead
Statute

The Supreme Court of
California held that as the statute was not based
as against public policy.

on any peculiar principle of morality or public
policy, but was intended merely for the protection of the
debtor, the latter had a perfect right to waive the benefit of
such protection whenever he should think proper.
When a debtor makes an assignment for the benefit of
creditors, it is well settled that if a debt is not barred by the
Running O
Statute In
Favor of
Insolvent

statute of limitations at the date of the assignment,

the statute will not run as against the assigned
estate as long as the property is in the hands of the
assignee. Does the same rule apply to the case
Corporation of a corporation debtor which has become insolvent and has gone into the hands of a receiver? In McDonaldv. State of Nebraska, oI Fed. 171, Caldwell, J., of the
Circuit Court of Appeals (8th Circ.) was strongly of the
opinion that the rule applied to claims against the receiver of
an insolvent national bank; but the question was not directly
before the court, since the action had been brought by the
treasurer of the State of Nebraska, in his official capacity,
while the debt was yet alive, and it was held that the substitution of the State of Nebraska as plaintiff was not a change of
the cause of action that would not relate back to the beginning
of the action, as far as the statute of limitation was concerned.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

Under the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee a
telegraph operator on a railroad is not a fellow servant of an
engineer, so as to preclude recovery by the latter
Follow
servants,
for the negligence of the former: ?. R?. v. De
Federal
Armond, 86 Tenn. 75. In such a case, even
Dedslon
though the cause of action arises in Tennessee,
the Federal Courts will disregard the state decisions and apply
their own rule that the fellow servant doctrine applies: .I
Cent.R.R. v. Bentz, 99 Fed. (Circ. Ct. of App., 6th Circ.), 657.
MORTGAGES.
Where a person lends money to a mortgagor for the express
purpose of paying off the mortgage, and .the money is so
used and the mortgage satisfied, and the lender
by Payment takes another mortgage on the property without
securing an assignment of the first mortgage, the
lender is subrogated to the rights of the former mortgagee as
against one who has an interest in the property subsequent to
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the satisfaction of the first mortgage, of which interest the
lender has no notice: Rachtal v. Smit/i, ioi Fed. (Circ. Ct. of
App., 5th Circ.), 159.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

In CapitalCo. v. PaperCo., 57 Pac., 504,the Supreme Court
of Kansas decided that there was no such officer of a corpoBusiness ration as a "business manager" known to the
Manager of law; therefore in an action on a note of the
Corporation, corporation signed by a person as "business
Authority manager" an averment was necessary that the
business manager had authority delegated to him to make the
note. However, upon a rehearing of the case (59 Pac. io62),
an averment in the complaint that the said corporation "made,
executed and delivered" the note was held to sufficiently
imply an averment that the business manager possessed the
requisite authority.
REAL PROPERTY.

The rule that requires actual possession to render a parol
contract for the sale of land enforceable is not absolute, but
Statute of may be relaxed in some cases. Thus in Bryson
Frauds, v. McShane, 35 S. E. 848, the decedent, the owner
Actual
of several pieces of land in different localities,
Possession promised the plaintiff that if the latter would nurse
and support her for the rest of her life she would deed her
[the plaintiff] all her property. The plaintiff lived with the
decedent and performed her part of the agreement, but before
the deeds were drawn the decedent died. The heirs of the
decedent objected to the enforcement of the parol contract in
regard to all the land except that on which the decedent
actually lived, on the ground that the plaintiff did not take
possession. The Court of Appeals of West Virginia decided
that the plaintiff had taken the requisite possession under the
contract and that an actual entry on all the tracts was not
necessary. This relaxation of the general rule is not permitted
in some jurisdictions: Austin v. Davis, 128 Ind. 472.
STATUTES.

Some difficulty arises where a statute prescribes that a
certain result shall follow an acknowledgment in writing.
Acknowledg- Must the acknowledgment be made for the exment In
press purpose of effecting the result or not?
Writing,
The code of Washington (§ 4624) provides that
Purpose
an illegitimate child shall be the heir of its
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father, when the latter acknowledges in writing that he is the
father. In Rohrer v. M'uller, 6o Pac. 122, the Supreme Court
of Washington decided that a writing was sufficient which
was not executed for the purpose of complying with the statute,
but as an affidavit to a complaint in a suit which the father
was bringing for the seduction of the child.
WAREHOUSEMEN.

The Pennsylvania act of September 24, 1866 (P. L. [1867]
1363), which provides in substance that the holder of a warehouse receipt shall be deemed to be the owner
Who Isa
warchouse of the goods represented thereby, being in derogama
tion of the common law, should receive a strict
construction. Thus in Moors v. Jagode, 45 Atl. 723, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided that where a member
of a mercantile firm institutes a so-called "warehouse," which
is practically controlled by the firm and used by the latter
alone, the firm may not place its own goods in the warehouse
and receive a warehouse receipt therefor; and even a bona-fide
holder of such a receipt will not be protected as against a
purchaser of the goods from the firm.

